Market Analysis for Law School Admissions by Zemsky, Robert et al.
AccessLex
AccessLex Resource Collections
Grantee Research AccessLex-Funded Research
1-2017
Market Analysis for Law School Admissions
Robert Zemsky
University of Pennsylvania
Patricia Burch
Stillwater Group
Richard Morgan
Learning Alliance for Higher Education
Follow this and additional works at: https://arc.accesslex.org/grantee
Part of the Education Economics Commons, and the Legal Education Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the AccessLex-Funded Research at AccessLex Resource Collections. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Grantee Research by an authorized administrator of AccessLex Resource Collections. For more information, please contact
ARC@accesslex.org.
Recommended Citation
Zemsky, Robert; Burch, Patricia; and Morgan, Richard, "Market Analysis for Law School Admissions" (2017). Grantee Research. 50.
https://arc.accesslex.org/grantee/50
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market Analysis for Law School Admissions 
 
Final Report  
 
 
The Alliance for Higher Education and Democracy (AHEAD) 
The University of Pennsylvania 
 
 
Robert Zemsky, Principal Investigator 
Patricia Burch 
Richard Morgan 
 
 
January 15, 2017 
  
 
   
The numbers are truly astonishing.  Between 2011 and 2015, total enrollments in the 200-
plus United States law schools whose data are regularly tracked by the American Bar 
Association (ABA) decreased by more than 20 percent.  The total number of “missing students” 
was just shy of 30,000, an amount which translates into the total enrollments of 38 average-sized 
law schools—24 private not-for-profit and 14 public. 
 
Figure 1  
Private	Law	Schools 2011 2015 Delta %	Delta
Total	Enrollment	 96,838			 	 76,358			 	 (20,480)		 	 -21%
Full	Time 80,075			 	 63,961			 	 (16,114)		 	 -20%
Part	Time 16,763			 	 12,397			 	 (4,366)				 	 -26%
Public	Law	Schools 2011 2015 Delta %	Delta
Total	Enrollment	 51,563			 	 42,068			 	 (9,495)				 	 -18%
Full	Time 46,368			 	 38,790			 	 (7,578)				 	 -16%
Part	Time 5,195					 	 4,171					 	 (1,024)				 	 -20%
An	Astonishing	Enrollment	Contraction	
 
  
Almost equally astonishing, however, is the fact that so little actually changed.  None of 
the 200-plus law schools that reported their enrollment data to the ABA closed.  The 65-35 
percentage split between private and public enrollments was maintained.  While total net revenue 
from JD tuitions declined by more than $400 million dollars, or 13 percent, law school staffing 
levels also declined, but much less dramatically.  There was some reduction in the market-prices 
some law schools charged (defined as average net tuition revenue per full-time JD student), but 
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there were also increases particularly among top-tier law schools, many of which increased their 
total JD enrollments despite the overall contraction in the market. 
 Those variances in price suggest that there might be considerable complexity behind the 
enrollment contraction and the price behavior it engendered—a complexity largely masked in the 
summary reports detailing a significantly smaller market for law school admissions after 2011.  
Drawing on our previous work for two major law schools, and our modeling of the price 
behavior across the market for collegiate undergraduate admissions, we set out to develop a set 
of statistical models capable of predicting the market-prices U.S. law schools were able to charge 
in 2015.  The data for this analysis came from the ABA via the Access Group’s Center for 
Research and Policy Analysis website—complete enrollment, admissions, program, and staffing 
data for 171 law schools.*  
 
Figure 2 
Public	Law	Schools Private	Law	Schools
R	Square 0.42 0.42
Coefficients
Median	LSAT $680 $980
First	Year	Attrition not	significant $49
Admit	Rate not	significant not	significant
Two	Regression	Models	Predicting	Market-Price
 
  
                                                
*Our analysis included 171 of the 202 and 204 Law Schools for which the Access Group and the 
American Bar Association reported data for the years 2011 and 2015, respectively.  We initially 
removed 14 Law Schools that were missing data for 2011, 2015, or both, in the categories of bar 
passage rate, employment data, tuition data, or percent of in-state enrollees.  As our analysis 
progressed, we removed another 19 schools determined to be outliers since their decreases in net 
revenue over the period 2011-2015 was greater than 50 percent, or their increases in net revenue 
during that period were greater than 50 percent. 
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As it turned out, the modeling itself was straightforward.  We started with our definition 
of a market-price as the dependent variable and then drew a set of independent variables from the 
ABA’s data set as posted by the Access Group: control—private not-for-profit or public; admit 
rate for full-time JD students; yield rate for full-time admitted JD applicants; percent minority; 
percent part-time; total number of graduates from 2014 employed; Bar Exam School Pass 
Percentage (Bar Passers/Bar Takers); and the 50th percentile LSAT scores for applicants to a full-
time JD program. 
Only four of these variables, however, proved necessary for predicting a law school’s 
market-price: control, first-year attrition rate, admit rate, and median LSAT score of applicants to 
a full-time JD program.  The median LSAT score was by far the dominant independent variable 
in the regressions.  On average, for public law schools, a one point increase in the median LSAT 
scores for applicants translated into a $680 increase in market-price.  The boost for private law 
schools was $980 per one point increase in their median LSAT score.  At the same time, among 
private law schools, a one percentage point increase in first-year attritions translated into a $49 
increase in market-price.  What that result suggests is that private law schools were increasing 
their market-prices slightly to offset losses through attrition in a tough, contracting market. 
We also noted that the attrition rates were playing a second, somewhat more important 
role, in organizing the law school admissions market.  To test this possibility, we segmented the 
private and public law school markets into separate tiers based on each institution’s reported 
first-year attrition rate as follows. 
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Figure 3 
 
Segmenting the public and private law school markets in this way taught a host of 
important lessons.  First, first-year attrition was much more prevalent among private law schools.   
Half of these institutions had first-year attrition rates of 10 percent or more.  The equivalent 
figure for public law schools was that less than a third had attrition rates of 10 percent or more.  
Second, the top tiers had much more ordered and hence predictable market-prices.  For the Tier 1 
private law schools, the same three variable regression models we used to predict the price 
behavior of all institutions explained 64 percent of the variance.  And for these 26 top-tier 
institutions, a one point increase in median LSAT scores, on average, translated into a $1349 
increase in market-price.  The regression model for Tier 2 private law schools yielded an even 
better fit—73 percent of the variance explained—but a much lower boost in market-price per one 
point increase in median LSAT score ($767).  The bottom half of the public law school market 
segment was more chaotic than organized, yielding models that did not produce significant 
results.  Here it is interesting to note that for the very bottom of this private law school sector—
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Tier 4, with first-year attrition greater than 20 percent—each school’s admit rate proved the most 
significant variable for predicting market-price.  As admit rates increased so did market-price.  
Figure 4 
 
 
The regression models for the three public law school tiers also yielded weaker models.  The 
model for the Tier 1 schools explained 55 percent of the variance and the model for Tier 2 
explained 40 percent.  As was the case for the private law schools, the bottom tier did not yield a 
significant model. 
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
75th Percentile $28,918 $25,554 $19,106 
MEDIAN $21,635 $20,020 $16,988 
25th Percentile $18,876 $18,714 $13,800 
$10,000
$20,000
$30,000
$40,000
$50,000
Public Law Schools Market-Prices 
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4
75th Percentile $45,561 $33,038 $35,011 $37,762 
MEDIAN $39,011 $29,939 $30,686 $35,671 
25th Percentile $29,894 $27,339 $26,953 $29,882 
$10,000
$20,000
$30,000
$40,000
$50,000
Private Law School Market-Prices
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 The third lesson learned in segmenting the law school admissions market by tiers based 
on first-year attrition rates was that the resulting structure provides a remarkably clear and 
ordered picture of the market itself. 
Figure 4 makes clear the ordered nature of the pricing of JD education, particularly 
among public law schools in the United States.  The dotted lines represent the 25th and 75th 
percentile for each price range for each tier.  The narrowness of the gap between these upper and 
lower bands testifies to the well-ordered nature of this set of market-prices.   
The other is the fact that the market-prices are monotonically ordered both top to bottom 
and left to right across the public law school sector.  The market-prices across the private law 
school sector are not nearly as well ordered.  The gap between the upper and lower bands is 
greater and prices rise in Tiers 3 and 4 compared to prices in Tier 2. 
Even more tightly banded were the median LSAT scores both public and private law 
schools reported to the ABA.  Nor should it surprise, given the importance that law schools 
attach to LSAT scores and rankings, that the graphs noting LSAT scores and those for the 
distribution of law school rankings by U.S. News & World Report are basically the same, further 
testifying to the strength of the structure we have defined by grouping law schools in terms of 
their first-year attrition rates. 
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
  
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
75th Percentile 163 160 155
MEDIAN 159 157 153
25th Percentile 155 154 149
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Public	Law	School	Median	LSAT	Score
Applicants	to	Full-Time	JD	Programs
Tier	1 Tier	2 Tier	3 Tier	4
75th	Percentile 169	 159	 155	 148	
MEDIAN 166	 156	 152	 147	
25th	Percentiles 160	 151	 149	 145	
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Applicants	to	Full-Time	JD	Programs
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Figure 6 
 
  
We also asked whether our attrition tiers were useful in explaining the distribution of 
minority enrollments.  And the answer was a decided, yes; on average, just under 40 percent of 
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4
75th Percentile 8 73 99 160
MEDIAN 21 82 134 160
25th Percentile 44 129 160 160
0
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100
125
150
Private Law School U.S. News Rankings
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
75th Percentile 25 44 92 
Median 47 72 106 
25th Percentile 82 111 160 
0
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100
150
Public Law School U.S. News Rankings
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the enrollments in private Tier 4 law schools came from minority students and, in the top band of 
this tier, minority enrollments exceeded 45 percent. 
Figure 7 
 
   
We can now use our segmented tier structure to ask, “What did and did not change over 
the last five years?”  Cleary, overall enrollments were reduced, but not in an even manner.  The 
greatest variances were among private law schools.  The top quarter of Tier 1 institutions 
Tier	1 Tier	2 Tier	3
75th	Percentile 31% 27% 34%
Median 21% 23% 22%
25th	Percentile 14% 18% 14%
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50%
Public	Law	School	Minority	Enrollments
Tier	1 Tier	2 Tier	3 Tier	4
75th	Percentile 35% 35% 28% 45%
MEDIAN 31% 25% 23% 38%
25th	Percentile 25% 22% 19% 31%
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40%
50%
Private	Law	School	Minority	Enrollments
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increased enrollments by two percent while institutions in the bottom quarter of the private 
market had lost in excess of 40 percent of their enrollments by 2015.  Public law school 
enrollments, on the other hand, were more constant: on average a 15 to 17 percent loss across all 
three public tiers. 
Figure 8 
 
  
Market-prices followed a similar pattern.  Overall, most institutions increased their 
market-prices.  Across public law schools, however, the price increases were largely modest and 
the overall structure of market-prices changed little.  The more pronounced volitility was in the 
private law school sector.  Across Tier 1, the median market-price increase was 18 percent.  
Elsewhere, there were more modest price increases except across Tier 4 law schools, which were 
trying to make up for lost enrollments by increasing prices, on average by 6 percent.  The top 
quarter of this tier were more aggressive, increasing their market-prices by nine percent or more. 
Tier	1 Tier	2 Tier	3 Tier	4 Tier	1 Tier	2 Tier	3
75th	Percentile 2% -15% -16% -23% -6% -13% -10%
MEDIAN -7% -24% -30% -37% -15% -19% -17%
25th	Percentile -20% -31% -38% -42% -21% -25% -30%
-50%
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
%	Changes	in	Full-Time	Enrollments
Private																																	Public
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Figure 9
 
Figure 9 also reflects the growing variance in market-prices being charged by private law 
schools.  Unlike in the public law school sector, the spread in private law school market-prices, 
both across and within tiers, increased substantially, suggesting that more disruptions are likely 
to follow if there is not a perceptable increase in private law school enrollments, particularly in 
Tier 3 and Tier 4 instititions. 
Tier	1 Tier	2 Tier	3 Tier	1 Tier	2 Tier	3
75th	Percentil $28,394	 $24,009	 $17,226	 $28,918	 $25,554	 $19,106	
MEDIAN $19,745	 $20,933	 $16,648	 $21,635	 $20,020	 $16,988	
25th	Percentile $18,360	 $17,639	 $13,424	 $18,876	 $18,714	 $13,800	
$10,000
$20,000
$30,000
$40,000
Public	In-State	Market-Prices
2011																																																					2015	
Tier	1 Tier	2 Tier	3 Tier	4 Tier	1 Tier	2 Tier	3 Tier	4
75th	Percentile $42,156 $32,867 $33,539 $34,752 $45,561 $33,038 $35,011 $37,762
MEDIAN $32,979 $30,547 $31,371 $33,663 $39,011 $29,939 $30,686 $35,671
25th	Percentile $29,827 $28,263 $28,625 $29,410 $29,894 $27,339 $26,953 $29,882
$10,000	
$20,000	
$30,000	
$40,000	
Private	Market-Prices
2011																																																																	2015		
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  There was a parallel spread in the number of faculty and administrators employed by the 
nation’s law schools.  Despite the severity of the market contraction, significant numbers of law 
schools increased the size of the their staffs.  
 
Figure 10 
 
 
On average, Tier 1 private law schools increased their staffs by six percent while the top 
quarter of that tier had staff increases greater than 18 percent.  The growth in the staff sizes of 
Tier 1 public law schools was only slightly less dramatic.  Almost nowhere in the public sector 
did staff reduction come close to matching the reductions in enrollments, and only among Tier 3 
and Tier 4 private law schools were there substantial staff reductions.  Recall, however, that 
enrollments in those two private law school tiers declined by 38% and 42%, respectively (see 
Figure 8 above), while staff reductions were held to 18% and 22%, respectively. 
 Taken together, Figures 8 through 10 suggest one possible future for American law 
schools.  The rich will get stronger, growing their staffs, increasing their market-prices, and, 
Tier	1 Tier	2 Tier	3 Tier	4 Tier	1 Tier	2 Tier	3
75th	Percentile 18% 5% 4% 14% 17% 13% 4%
MEDIAN 6% -7% -7% -9% 2% 0% -5%
25th	Percentile -5% -12% -18% -22% -3% -2% -12%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
%	Change	in	Faculty	and	Administrators
Private																																								Public	
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where and when possible, modestly growing their enrollments.  Those institutions facing the 
most severe problems are likely to be from the bottom of the private law school market, Tier 3 
and Tier 4 institutions.  These private law schools  have already suffered substantial student 
loses, both through increased attrition and significantly below average intakes of new students.  
Given that their loss of enrollments greatly exceeds their staff reductions these are institutions 
who may not have sustainable futures.  Public law schools in the sector’s bottom two tiers are 
generally better positioned—smaller declines in enrollment, more stable, but still declining 
market-prices, and staffing levels that have been reduced, but not dramatically.  As we reported 
to the Access Group’s 2016 Legal Education Research Symposium, these institutions along with 
mid-market private law schools (Tier 2) appear to be holding their breadths, hoping they can 
restore their enrollments before they have to fundamentally change their operations and 
educational programs.  Our bet is that this “hold your breadth” strategy will not prove practical 
much longer. 
